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I. Introduction

You work at a small, nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting civil
and constitutional rights. One morning, your secretary introduces you to two
young adults, Charles and Maddie, who need some legal advice. Only a few
years out of high school, they are both part-time students at Diablo Hills
Community College (DHCC), trying to earn enough credits to transfer out.
Last year, after reading a number of books by Christopher Hitchens' and
watching the film Jesus Camp,2 Maddie and Charles grew concerned over the
dangers posed by religious fundamentalism. Therefore, they decided to form a
student group on campus, the Huxley Club. The mission of the club is to
provide a place for students to celebrate the progress of human reason and to
expose the intellectually bankrupt claims of primitive religious belief systems.
The club would hold bi-weekly meetings that were open to all, students and
nonstudents alike. DHCC encourages all student groups to apply for official
recognition from the Student Governing Board (SGB). Benefits of recognition
include access to classrooms for meetings, permission to advertise on campus
bulletin boards and the school List-Serv, a faculty advisor, space on the college
website, and money from the student activities fund. Prospective student clubs
are required to submit a proposed constitution to the SGB.
After careful thought and discussion, Charles and Maddie meet with some
friends and draft a constitution for the Huxley Club. It outlines the goals ofthe
club, creates several leadership positions within the club, and lists the only
requirement for membership--enrollment at DHCC. The only additional
requirement for officers is that they cannot be active members of any religious
community that professes a belief in a supreme deity. Charles and Maddie feel
very strongly that this requirement is vital to help ensure that the goals of the
club are carried out faithfully. They submit the proposed constitution to the
SGB, expecting a quick approval.
Two weeks later they receive a notice from the SGB requesting that they
re-draft the Huxley constitution to align with the requirements of Article 5 of
the college's Equal Educational Opportunity Policy (EEOP), which states that
the school must provide equal educational opportunities to all students without
regard to race, color, sexual identity, age, disability, marital status, or religion.
The SGB claims that the Huxley Club improperly discriminates on the basis of
religious belief. The students appeal the decision, arguing that the club's

1. See generally CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: How RELIGION POISONS
EVERYTING (2007) (describing the detrimental impacts of organized religion).

2.

JEsus CAMP (Magnolia Pictures 2006).
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meetings and events would be open to anyone, and that the officer requirement
is essential to preserving the club's message. The SGB considers the appeal,
but ultimately rejects it, denying the Huxley Club official school recognition so
long as the constitution's officer requirements remain unchanged. Of course,
the students are still free to form the club, but they will have to meet in public
parts of the campus, such as the quad or the cafeteria. Charles and Maddie do
not want to have to change the nature of the club. They wonder, "Don't we
have some First Amendment rights or something like that?"
This hypothetical scenario is proving to be the reality for a number of
student groups around the country.3 This Note focuses on two cases in
particular that have already been litigated at the federal appellate level. In
2006, the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of a Christian Legal Society (CLS)
chapter at Southern Illinois University Law School (SIU). 4 CLS had
challenged an SIU decision denying official recognition to the local chapter
because the club violated school antidiscrimination policy by refusing to allow
practicing homosexuals to become members. 5 CLS claimed that the university
action violated its First Amendment rights of free speech and expressive
association.6 The Seventh Circuit found that CLS had demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits for each claim and reinstated a preliminary
injunction against SIU. 7 At the high school level, in 2008, the Ninth Circuit
ruled in favor of a Washington school district, affirming the school district's
decision to deny official recognition to a religious student group Truth.8 The
school district based its decision on the fact that the student group limited
voting membership to professing Christians, violating the school district's
nondiscrimination policy. 9 Truth claimed that the school district's action
violated its First Amendment rights to free speech and expressive association.' 0

3. See, e.g., Paul Davenport, Christian Group Sues for Right to Discriminate,
AssOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 17, 2004 (describing lawsuits filed against Arizona State University
and Hastings College of Law in the University of California system by student chapters of the
Christian Legal Society).
4. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 2006) (reinstating a
preliminary injunction against a university that denied official recognition to CLS chapter).
5. Id. at 858.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 859.
8. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting high school
club's claim that school district had violated rights of free speech and expressive association in
denying official recognition to group).
9. Id. at 637-41.
10. Id. at 637.
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The Ninth Circuit rejected both claims." Similar facts, different result-what
is the explanation?
The Seventh Circuit analyzed the expressive association and free speech
claims independently, using a different framework for each claim.' 2 By
contrast, the Ninth Circuit's opinion collapsed the claims together and analyzed
the case based on the type of forum the school had created. 13 Can these two
differing opinions be reconciled in some way? Does the right of expressive
association-and the corollary right of nonassociation-receive less protection
on the public campus? Is there a way to safeguard this right while respecting
the confines of the limited public forum of the public school and university?
This Note attempts to answer these questions.
Part II details the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence regarding the right
of expressive association, specifically as it relates to the clash between
antidiscrimination laws and group autonomy. Part III briefly reviews the
Court's jurisprudence on free speech and the public forum doctrine, with a
focus on the potentially conflicting ways the Court has applied the doctrine in
the university context. Part IV reviews the opinions from the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits, the underlying facts, and the reason for the differing outcomes.
Part V proposes a third way to approach the issue, one that protects the
associational rights of student groups within the confines of the limited public
forum. When a student group's message depends on the ability to select the
messengers-via membership criteria-then arguably the group's membership
criteria are a part of the message. This principle is well-illustrated by a case
from the Second Circuit, Hsu v. Roslyn School District.14 This case provides
the foundation for how the expressive association rights of student groups can
be protected under a strict scrutiny standard in the limited public forum of a
university. Additionally, Part V addresses the Court's inconsistent application
of the "limited public forum" doctrine, arguing that the strong speech
protections of Widmar v. Vincent 15 should apply to the content-based limits
11.

Id.

12. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006) (separately
addressing expressive association claim and free speech claim).
13. Truth, 542 F.3d at 652 (Fisher, J., concurring) ("Expressive Association is simply
another way of speaking, only the group communicates its message through the act of
associating....

).

14. See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 848 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that a religious club should have been granted access to school forum under the terms
of the Equal Access Act).
15. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that a University which
created a forum generally open to student groups could not exclude a group based on the
religious content of its speech).
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imposed by schools and universities in their nondiscrimination policies.
Finally, Part V argues that the distinction between compelled association and
conditioned benefits is illusory, both constitutionally and practically.
II.ExpressiveAssociation
A. GeneralBackground
The Supreme Court first articulated expressive association-the ability to
associate with others for the purpose of conveying a message-in NAACP v.
Alabama.16 Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan recognized that "[e]ffective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than
once recognized by remarking on the close nexus between the freedoms of
speech and assembly. ' 1 7 This fundamental right was long understood to be an
implicit guarantee within the First Amendment's protections of speech and
assembly.' 8 The ability to associate freely played a key role in the formation of
this country.19 Nearly 200 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that
"Americans form associations for the smallest undertakings. It is evident that
the [English] consider association as a powerful means of action, but the
20
[Americans] seem[] to regard it as the only means they have of acting."
Associations serve as a powerful shield, protecting individuals from the tyranny
of the state. 2' The right of expressive association is necessary to give force to
16.

See NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958) (finding the right to

expressive association).
17. Id.
18. See id.(noting that the freedom to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs is "an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech"); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in

activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends.").
19. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 294 (1981) ("[T]he practice of persons sharing common views banding together to
achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American political process. The 18th-century

Committees of Correspondence and the pamphleteers were early examples of this phenomena
and the Federalist Papers were perhaps the most significant and lasting example.").
20. 2 ALExIS DE TocQuEvILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 130 (Francis Bowen ed., Henry
Reeve trans., Cambridge 3d ed. 1863).
21.

See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1297 (2d ed. 1988) ("[A]

plurality of associations interposed between the individual and the state is vital both as an
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enumerated rights, such as speech, worship, and the freedom to petition the
government.22
Inherent in the right to associate is a correlative right of nonassociation.23
An association that forms to voice a message cannot accomplish its purpose if it
is unable to determine who will compose that voice.24 In effect, the freedom
not to associate is the freedom to discriminate. Inevitably, this freedom to
discriminate will conflict with society's interests in ending invidious
discrimination.2 5 The Supreme Court has struggled to define the limits of the
right of expressive association, specifically as applied to groups that
discriminate in their membership policies.2 6
B. CompelledAssociation
The tension between the rights of an expressive association to choose its
members and the equality concerns of historically marginalized groups came to
a head in the 1980s in a series of Supreme Court cases pitting private
organizations against state antidiscrimination policies. One such case was
Roberts v. United States Jaycees. The Roberts case arose out of a conflict
between a private civic organization-the Jaycees-and the state ofMinnesota,
which had passed a law banning gender-based discrimination in places of
expression of the need to congregate and as a buffer against all-powerful central
authority....").
22. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("An individual's freedom to
speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be
vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in
group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.").
23. See id.at 623 ("Freedom of association ...plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate.").
24. See id.at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Protection of the association's right to
define its membership derives from the recognition that the formation of an expressive
association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that
voice.").
25.

See 2 RODNEY S. SMOLLA, SMOLLA &NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 17:42 (2008)

("IT]he whole point of the freedom of association line of First Amendment cases is that freedom
of association includes a correlative First Amendment freedom of nonassociation, and freedom
of nonassociation is in inherent tension with antidiscrimination policies, which force
association."); see also William P. Marshall, Discriminationand the Right ofAssociation, 81
Nw. U. L. REv. 68, 69 (1986) ("The right to choose one's associates (freedom) is pitted against
the right to equal treatment (equality), a most fundamental conflict.").
26. See infra Part II.B (discussing the line of cases dealing with the conflict between state
antidiscrimination policies and the right of expressive association).
27. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984) (upholding Minnesota law
which forced all-male private organization to admit women as full voting members).
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public accommodation.28 The Minnesota chapter of the Jaycees barred women
from obtaining voting membership or holding positions as officers in the
group. 29 While recognizing the Jaycees' right of expressive association, the
Court noted that this right is not absolute.3 ° Minnesota had a compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination on the basis of gender,3' and, importantly,
the goals of the state antidiscrimination law were unrelated to the suppression
of ideas.32 Important to the result was the fact that, as applied to the Jaycees,
there was no basis in the record for concluding that admitting women as voting
members would impede the group's ability to engage in protected activities or
to disseminate its preferred views.33 In several cases following Roberts, state
antidiscrimination laws were challenged on similar grounds, with similar
results.34 However, writing for the majority in New York State Club Ass 'n v.
City of New York, Justice Powell left open the possibility that a different
outcome could be reached if a group could persuade the Court that compelled
association would force a change in its message:
It is conceivable, of course, that an association might be able to show that it
is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to
advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its
membership to those who share the same sex, for example, or the same
religion. In the case before us, however, it seems sensible enough to
believe that many of the large clubs covered by the Law are not of this
kind.35

28. Id.
29. Id. at 613.
30. See id. at 623 ("Infringements... may be justified by regulations adopted to serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.").
31. See id. ("We are persuaded that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the statute to the
Jaycees may have on the male members' associational freedoms.").
32. See id. at 624 ("[Tjhe Act reflects the State's strong historical commitment to
eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and
services.... That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of expression, plainly serves
compelling state interests of the highest order.").
33. See id. at 627 ("[A]ny claim that admission of women as full voting members will
impair a symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are not permitted to vote is
attenuated at best.").
34. See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc., v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988)
(upholding a state antidiscrimination law against First Amendment challenge by private club);
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Club Intern. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 550 (1987) (same).
35. NY State Club, 487 U.S. at 13.
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The next major case was Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.36 In Hurley, the petitioners-organizers of a
yearly St. Patrick's Day parade in Boston-sought to exclude a group of
homosexual individuals who wanted to march in the parade as a unit to
demonstrate their solidarity with other gay individuals of Irish descent." The
Massachusetts Supreme Court had ordered the parade organizers to include the
group based on a state public accommodations law that prohibited
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 38 In a unanimous decision, the
Supreme Court reversed the order of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the
grounds that it was constitutionally impermissible for the state to compel the
39
parade organizers to promote a certain message they would choose to exclude.
Furthermore, the right to exclude a certain message did not mean the parade
organizers had to identify the message they intended to promote.40 The parade
organizers did not intend to exclude homosexual individuals per se, but only
the specific group that sought to march in the parade as a unit in support of
homosexual rights.4 1 The Court found that forcing the organizers to include the
group would alter the expressive message of the parade.42
In 2001, the Court finally laid down a framework to evaluate a claimed
violation of expressive association in Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale.43 James
Dale was an Eagle Scout who held adult membership in the Boy Scouts while
attending college. 44 During his time at college, Dale openly identified himself
as a homosexual and joined several campus groups advocating homosexual
36. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 581 (1995) (overturning state court order that would have forced parade organizers to
include marchers advocating homosexual rights).
37. Id. at 561-62.
38. Id. at 563-64 (citing Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. v.
Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1295-98 (Mass. 1994)).
39. See id. at 573 ("[T]his use of the State's power violates the fundamental rule of
protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of
his own message.").
40. See id. at 569 ("[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection .... ).
41. See id. at 572 ("Petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and
no individual member of [the gay rights group] claims to have been excluded from parading as a
member of any group that the Council has approved to march.").
42. See id. at 572-73 ("Since every participating unit affects the message conveyed by the
private organizers, the state courts' application of the statute produced an order essentially
requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade.").
43. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (overturning state court
decision requiring Boy Scout organization to admit openly gay scoutmaster).

44. Id.
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rights.45 The Boy Scouts subsequently revoked Dale's adult membership on the
grounds that his homosexual lifestyle violated the Boy Scout oath, which
required all members to be "morally straight."46 Dale challenged this decision
in state court on the grounds that the Boy Scouts were violating a state law
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places ofpublic
accommodation.4 7 The case made its way to the New Jersey Supreme Court,
which ruled in favor of Dale's claim and rejected the Boy Scouts' contention
that readmitting Dale would violate the group's right to expressive
association. 48
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist evaluated the Boy Scouts'
claim based on a three-part framework: first, whether the Boy Scouts could be
classified as an expressive association; 49 second, whether the forced inclusion
of Dale would force the Boy Scouts to express a message they would choose
not to express; 50 and finally, given these First Amendment interests, whether
the State of New Jersey had a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against homosexuals.51 While recognizing that this type of inquiry is
necessarily fact-specific, 5 2 the Court found that the Boy Scouts engaged in
expressive activity by attempting to transmit a system of values to its
members.53 Moving on to the second prong, the Court recognized the
importance of membership criteria by stating that "[t]he forced inclusion of an
unwanted person in a group infringes the group's freedom of expressive
45. Id. at 645.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998)).
48. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1226 (N.J. 1999) (holding that the
Boy Scouts violated state public accommodations law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation).
49. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 ("The First Amendment's protection of expressive
association is not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must
engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private.").
50. See id. at 653 ("We must then determine whether Dale's presence as an assistant
scoutmaster would significantly burden the Boy Scouts' desire to not 'promote homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."' (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5, Boy Scouts
of Am. v. Dale, No. 99-699 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2000))).
51. See id. at 658-59 ("So in these cases, the associational interest in freedom of
expression has been set on one side of the scale, and the State's interest on the other.").
52. See id. at 648-49 ("Because this is a First Amendment case where the ultimate
conclusions of law are virtually inseparable from findings of fact, we are obligated to
independently review the factual record to ensure that the state court's judgment does not
unlawfully intrude on free expression.").
53. Id. at 649.
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association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. 5 4 The Boy Scout leadership
interpreted the command to be "morally straight" as prohibiting homosexual
conduct,55 and the Court deferred to this interpretation,56 despite any apparent
inconsistencies with other rules that the Boy Scouts followed.57 This does not
mean that "an expressive association can[] erect a shield against
antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member
from a particular group would impair its message."5' 8 However, because of
Dale's open participation in various student groups advocating homosexual
rights, Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would "force the organization to send
a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts
accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior." 59 Therefore,
this application of the New Jersey public accommodations law to the Boy
Scouts violated the group's right of expressive association.6 ° With regard to the
last prong, the Court did not address the question of whether the state's interest
was compelling but simply ruled that it did notjustify the burden it imposed on
the Boy Scouts. 6 1 However, Justice Rehnquist hinted at the fact that even a
compelling state interest could be insufficient to justify the burden imposed by
the antidiscrimination law on a group's right to expressive association.62
These cases clearly establish a right of expressive association protected by
the Constitution, even when that right conflicts with state nondiscrimination
policies. How is this right affected when a student group asserts its right of
54. Id. at 648.
55. Id. at 651-52.
56. See id. at 653 ("As we give deference to an association's assertions regarding the
nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association's view of what would
impair its expression.").
57. See id. at 651 ("[Ilt is not the role of the courts to reject a group's expressed values
because they... find them internally inconsistent."); id.at 655 ("[T]he First Amendment simply
does not require that every member of a group agree on every issue in order for the group's
policy to be 'expressive association."').
58. Id. at 653.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 656 (concluding that state court decision forcing the Boy Scouts to accept a
gay scoutmaster violated its right of expressive association).
61. See id. at 659 ("The state interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommodations
law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive
association.").
62. See id. at 657 ("We recognized in... Roberts and Duarte that States have a
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women in public accommodations.
But in each of these cases we went on to conclude that the enforcement of these statutes would
not materially interfere with the ideas that the organization sought to express.").
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expressive association on a public campus? The last major Supreme Court case
to address this question was Healy v. James63 in 1971.
C. Student Groups at a Public University: Healy v. James
In Healy, the Supreme Court resolved a dispute between the
administration of Central Connecticut State College (CCSC) and a group of
students seeking official recognition for a local chapter of the Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS). 64 The president of CCSC denied recognition to the
student chapter of SDS because of violent activities advocated by the national
chapter of the SDS.65 Consequences of the denial were fairly severe:
"members [of SDS] were deprived of the opportunity to place announcements
regarding meetings, rallies, or other activities in the student newspaper; they
were precluded from using various campus bulletin boards; and-most
importantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus facilities for
holding meetings., 66 Several student members of SDS sued the college on the
grounds that the school had violated their First Amendment rights to expression
and association.6 7 The case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court,
where the Court initially rejected the view that "First Amendment protections
should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at
large. '68 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell found that the denial of
official recognition abridged the students' associational rights. 69 Furthermore,
"the group's possible ability to exist outside the campus community does not
70
ameliorate significantly the disabilities imposed by the President's action."
The Court rejected a number of justifications offered by the college, including
the fact that the president of the college found the views of the national chapter

63. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 194 (1971) (striking down a state court decision
that allowed state college to bar a student group from conducting meetings on campus).
64. Id.at 169-70.
65. Id.at 174-75. The President's decision was based partly on transcripts of hearings
before the U.S. House of Representatives Internal Security Committee, detailing the violent
activities associated with the national chapter of the SDS. Id. at 178.

66.
67.
68.

Id.at 176.
Id.at 177.
Id.at 180.

69.

See id. at 181 ("The primary impediment to free association flowing from

nonrecognition is the denial of use of campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate
purposes.").
70.

Id.at 183.
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to be "abhorrent."'7 However, the Court did leave room for the college to
impose requirements directed at an organization's activities. 72 The Court
reasoned that "[a]ssociational activities need not be tolerated where they
infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere
with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education. 7 3 The Court
never defined what it meant by a "reasonable campus rule. 74 Nevertheless,
Healy has served as the groundwork for rulings protecting the associational
rights of unpopular groups at public universities.75 The case did not deal with
compelled association.76
Of course, the relative strength of many First Amendment rights depends
on where a person is exercising them; for example, a group's associational
rights do not carry the same weight in a prison that they would on a city
sidewalk. The next Part shifts gears by examining how free speech rights differ
depending on the type of forum in which that speech is occurring. Because
both the Seventh Circuit in Walker and the Ninth Circuit in Truth employed the
public forum doctrine to evaluate their respective cases, 77 it is worth briefly
71. See id. at 187-88 ("The College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may
not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be
abhorrent.").
72. See id.at 188 ("The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the permissibility of
regulation is the line between mere advocacy and advocacy 'directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and... likely to incite or produce such action."' (quoting Brandenburg

v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969))).
73. Id.at 189.
74. The Court did, however, list several of the restrictions that the college imposed on its
students, including requirements that students could not "deprive others of the right to speak or
be heard,... invade the privacy of others, ... damage the property of others,... [or] disrupt the
regular and essential operation of the college." Id.; see also Papish v. Bd.of Curators of Univ.
of Minn., 410 U.S. 667, 668-71 (1973) (upholding a student's right to distribute newspaper
with an offensive heading on campus despite university policy that students must abide by
"generally acceptable standards of conduct.").
75. See, e.g., Gay Student Servs. v. Tex. A&M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1319 (5th Cir.
1984) (overturning decision by public university denying official recognition to homosexual
rights student group); Aman v. Handler, 653 F.2d 41, 41 (1st Cir. 1981) (overturning decision
by public university denying official recognition to student group from the Unification Church
and directing lower court to decide the case in accordance with the standards from Healy); Gay
Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 164-67 (4th Cir. 1976) (overturning decision
by public university denying official recognition to homosexual rights student group).
76. See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 25, § 17:42 ("The delicate balance struck by Justice
Powell's opinion in Healy does little to clearly resolve the question of whether a student group
may be denied recognition for discriminating in its rules governing eligibility for
membership.").
77. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 648-50 (9th Cir. 2008) (employing the
public forum doctrine to evaluate the free speech claim of the petitioners); Christian Legal Soc'y
v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 865-67 (7th Cir. 2006) (same).
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reviewing the various forum classifications and the contours of each forum,
specifically as applied in the university setting.
I1.Public Forum Doctrine
A. The Three Classifications
The public forum doctrine arose from the fact that not all public forums
are created equal.7 8 When it comes to free speech and the First Amendment, a
city sidewalk is not like a college classroom, which is not like a government
office building. 79 To help simplify the issue, the Supreme Court has outlined
three major types of public forums.80 When an individual or a group raises a
First Amendment speech claim against a government actor, a court first must
determine what type of forum is at issue and then must apply the appropriate
test to determine whether the speech restriction is constitutional.
First is the traditional public forum: "At one end of the spectrum are
streets and parks which 'have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.' ,81
In a traditional public forum, government may impose reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions on speech activity, 82 but viewpoint-based regulation of

78. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799-800
(1985) ("Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who
wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard
to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker's
activities.").
79. See KEITH WERHAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 136 (2004) ("The Court's categorization of
public property into three discrete levels of forum status resembles the justices' categorization
of speech into three levels of First Amendment Protection .... They... reflect the
commonsense judgment that the nature and degree of free speech protections should vary for...
different kinds of public property.").
80. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 396
(1993) (overturning lower court decision permitting school district to deny religious group
access to facilities after normal school hours).
81. Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (quoting
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)); see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515
(1975) ("'[S]treets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places are so historically
associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of
exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely."' (quoting
Amalg. Food Empire Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968))).
82. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
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speech is always impermissible and any content-based regulation will be
subject to strict scrutiny.
The second type of forum is the designated public forum. 84 This type of
forum is created when the government "intentionally open[s] a nontraditional
forum for public discourse., 85 A court will evaluate any content-based speech
regulations using strict scrutiny, just as it would for a traditional public forum.86
While the creation of a designated public forum is necessarily case-specific,
examples include a senior center,87 a city-leased theater, and advertising space
in city transit vehicles.89
The last type of forum is the nonpublic forum. 90 In a nonpublic forum,
content-based restrictions on speech must be reasonable and not used as a way
to keep out disfavored viewpoints.9 1 Examples of nonpublic forums include
93
jailhouses 92 and internal school mail systems.
83. See id. ("In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all
communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end.").
84. See id.
("A second category consists of public property which the State has opened for
use by the public as a place for expressive activity. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce
certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to create
the forum in the first place.").
85. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
86. See Perry,460 U.S. at 46 ("Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the
open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in
a traditional public forum.").
87. See Church on the Rock v. CityofAlbuquerque, 84F.3d 1273,1278 (10th Cir. 1996)
(noting that the Bear Canyon Senior Center was a designated public forum because the city had
opened it up to the public for "discussive purposes").
88. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (finding that cityleased theater was dedicated to expressive activities and was therefore a designated public
forum).
89. See Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 248 (3d
Cir. 1998) ("We accordingly look to the authority's intent with regard to the forum in question
and ask whether [the authority] clearly and deliberately opened its advertising space to the
public.").
90. See Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,46 (1983) ("Public
property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication is governed
by different standards.").
91. See id. ("In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the State may reserve the
forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker's view.").
92. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (noting that the State does not have
to open up its own property for expressive purposes).
93. See Perry,460 U.S. at 48 ("Because the school mail system is not a public forum, the
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B. Universitiesand the Limited Public Forum
When a public university creates a forum for student groups to obtain
recognition, where does that forum fall on the aforementioned spectrum? The
Court's answer has not always been clear. In the case of Widmar v. Vincent,94 a
registered religious student group at the University of Missouri at Kansas City
(UMKC) brought a First Amendment claim against the school after they were
told they could no longer meet in university buildings. 95 The expulsion
occurred after the UKMC administration adopted a regulation that prohibited
the use of university facilities for religious worship or religious teachings.9 6
The forum at issue was one "generally open for use by student groups. 9 7 The
Court recognized the unique nature of the educational environment, noting that
"decisions of this Court have never denied a university's authority to impose
reasonable regulations compatible with that [educational] mission upon the use
of its campus and facilities., 98 At the same time, Supreme Court "cases leave
no doubt that the First Amendment rights of speech and association extend to
the campuses of state universities." 99 The majority noted that "[h]ere the
UMKC has discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their
desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and
discussion."' 00 The Court implicitly equated the forum with a designated
public forum:
In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on
the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University must
therefore satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based

exclusions.

It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a

compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.1°1

School District had no 'constitutional obligation per se to let any organization use the school
mail boxes."' (quoting Conn. State Fed'n of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471,
481 (2d Cir. 1976))).
94. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that a University which
created a forum generally open to student groups could not exclude a group based on the
religious content of its speech).
95. Id. at 265.
96. Id.
97. Id.
at 267.
98. Id.
at 268 n.5.
99. Id.
at 268-69.
100. Id.
at 269 (emphasis added).
101.

Id.at 269-70 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized the fact that the basis for its

decision was the fact that the university had created a forum "generally open to student groups."
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The Court held that UMKC did not have a compelling justification for
excluding the student group based on the religious content of its speech.' 0 2
Another case, decided more than a decade later, involved a student
publication at the University of Virginia (UVA).'I 3 The UVA administration
had created a Student Activities Fund (SAF)that was available to help fund the4
activities of various student groups, including student publications. 1
However, university guidelines excluded certain student activities from SAF
eligibility-specifically, religious activities.10 5 A student publication-Wide
Awake Publications (WAP)-published a magazine that examined
contemporary issues from a Christian perspective. 16 WAP applied for funds
from the SAF to pay for printing costs but was denied on the grounds that WAP
was a "religious activity."'1 7 In evaluating the case, the Court first classified the
SAF as a "limited public forum,"' 08 where "[the Court has] observed a
distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be
permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other
hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when
directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations."' 0 9 While the
distinction between content and viewpoint is "not a precise one,"" 0 the majority
refused to characterize UVA's action as content-based discrimination, stating
that "[b]y the very terms of the SAF prohibition, the University does not
exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those
student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints." '' Even if12
funding were scarce, this would not justify viewpoint-based discrimination,
Id.at 277.
102. See id. at 270-76 (holding that allowing a religious group to access university
facilities would not violate the Establishment Clause under the Lemon test).
103. See Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,841 (1995) (holding that
the University could not deny funding to student publication simply because of the religious
viewpoints of that publication).
104. Id at 824.
105. Id.at 825. The University Guidelines defined a "religious activity" as any activity that
"primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."

Id.
106. See id. at 826 ("[WAP] offers a Christian perspective on both personal and
community issues, especially those relevant to college students at the University of Virginia.").
107. Id.at 827.
108. Id.at 830.
109. Id.at 829-30.
110. Id.at831.
111. Id.
112. See id.at 835 ("The government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among
private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity.").
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particularly in a place where intellectual freedom should be allowed to
flourish. 13 Just as in Widmar, the university justified its actions based on a fear
of violating the Establishment Clause," 14 but the Court did not accept this
argument as a compelling justification for viewpoint discrimination." 5
The next Part explores the two cases wherein student groups seeking
official school recognition asserted both speech and expressive association
claims.
IV. The Seventh Circuit vs. The Ninth Circuit
A. Christian Legal Society v. Walker
Like most universities, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale and its
School of Law (SIU)-a public university-encourage students to form oncampus groups and apply for official recognition from SIU. 1 6 The benefits of
recognition for law student organizations include access to the law school listserv, permission to post information on law school bulletin boards, an
appearance on lists of official student organizations in law school publications
and on its website, the ability to reserve conference rooms and meeting space, a
faculty advisor, and law school money." 17 The Christian Legal Society, a
nationwide association of law students and legal professionals who share a
commitment to the Christian faith, had a student-run chapter at SIU in 2005
that was one of seventeen student organizations officially recognized by the law
school. " 8 The student chapter of CLS at SIU opened its meetings to anyone,
113. See id. at 836 ("For the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particular
viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the
vital centers for the Nation's intellectual life, its college and university campuses.").
114. See id. at 838 ("The Court of Appeals ruled that withholding SAF support from Wide
Awake contravened the Speech Clause of the First Amendment, but proceeded to hold that the
University's action was justified by the necessity of avoiding a violation of the Establishment
Clause .... ").
115. See id. at 842 ("It does not violate the Establishment Clause for a public university to
grant access to its facilities on a religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of student groups,
including groups that use meeting rooms for sectarian activities, accompanied by some
devotional exercises.").
116. See generally SOUTHERN ILINoIs UNIVERSrrY AT CARBoNDALE, REGISTERED STuDENT
ORGANIZATION HANDBOOK (July 2007), availableat http://www.law.siu.edu/studentlife/student_
handbookPDF.pdf (describing the program for student organizations seeking official university
recognition).
117. See id. at 12-13 (listing twenty benefits and privileges that come with being a
Registered Student Organization).
118. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 2006).
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'but required that all voting members and officers subscribe to a statement of
faith and refrain from engaging in certain behaviors that CLS considers
immoral-including homosexual conduct. " 9 "In February 2005 someone
complained to SIU about CLS's membership... requirements," which
precluded practicing homosexuals "from becoming voting members or
officers."' 120 After CLS re-affirmed its membership policies, the law school
dean revoked CLS's registered student organization status because the
membership requirements violated university policy. 2 1 As a result, the student

chapter of CLS was stripped of all the benefits of being an official student
organization. 122 CLS brought suit against school officials and moved for a
preliminary injunction, 123 claiming that SIU violated CLS's right ofexpressive
association, free speech, and free exercise of religion. 24 In ruling on the
motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court found that CLS failed to
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. 25 The district
court focused on the fact that the school was not forcing the student chapter of
CLS to accept anyone as a member and was permitting the group to meet on
campus. 12 6 CLS appealed and moved for preliminary injunction pending
119. Id. at 858; see also Christian Legal Society, Membership Statement of Faith and
Sexual Morality Standards, Mar. 25, 2004, available at http://www.clsnet.org/clsPages/
bod/moralityStds.php (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (stating that CLS members must agree to
refrain from participating in or advocating "sexually immoral" conduct, which includes
"fornication, adultery, and homosexual conduct").
120. ChristianLegal Soc'y, 453 F.3d at 858.
121. Id. Specifically, the dean noted that SIU had an Affirmative Action/Equal
Employment Opportunity Policy, which mandated that SIUJ must provide "'equal... education
opportunities for all qualified persons without regard to race, color, religion... [or] sexual
orientation. . .. "' Id. at 869 (quoting Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 4, Christian Legal Soc'y
v. Walker, No. 05-3239 (7th Cir. Sept. 27, 2005)). The SIU Board of Trustees also adopted a
policy providing that "' [n]o. ..recognized student organization shall be authorized unless it
adheres to all appropriate federal or state laws concerning nondiscrimination and equal
opportunity."' Id. at 858 (quoting Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 5, Christian Legal Soc'y v.
Walker, No. 05-3239 (7th Cir. Sept. 27, 2005)).
122. See Walker, 453 F.3d at 858 (noting that CLS was no longer able to reserve
classrooms for private meetings, use the bulletin board for club postings, avail itself of a faculty
representative, or access student funds).
123. See Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Christian Legal
Soc'y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No. 05-4070 (S.D. I11.Apr. 5, 2005)
(requesting preliminary and permanent injunction against SIU to prevent de-recognition of
student chapter of CLS).
124. Id.
5.1-8.2.
125. See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. v. Walker, 2005 WL 1606448, *3
(S.D. Ill. July 5, 2005) ("It is not clear that Plaintiff ultimately will prevail on the merits---at
best it is a close question."), rev'd, 453 F.3d 853, 857 (7th Cir. 2006).
126. See id. ("There is no showing of irreparable harm ....
S1U's withholding of
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appeal.' 27 The Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and
granted the preliminary injunction for three reasons. 21 8 This Note will address
the court's last two factors.
Addressing the expressive association claim, 129 the court began by noting
that "[g]ovemment action may impermissibly burden the freedom to associate
in a variety of ways; two of them are 'impos[ing] penalties or withhold[ing]
benefits from individuals because of their membership in a disfavored group'
and 'interfer[ing] with the internal organization or affairs of the group." 1 30 A
critical part of the right of expressive association is the right to exclude
members from the group.' 3' The majority characterized this case as a "forced
inclusion" case and employed the three-part framework of Dale to evaluate the
expressive association claim of CLS. 132 The court did not spend much time on
the first question, because "[i]t would be hard to argue-and no one does-that
CLS is not an expressive association."' 33 On the second question, according to
the majority, the answer was clear: To accept active homosexual members,
recognized student organization status only means that Plaintiff will have to use other meeting
areas and other ways to communicate with members and potential members.").
127. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006).
128. See id.(reviewing the three reasons for granting the plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction). The court stated:
First, it is not clear CLS actually violated any SIU policy, which was the
justification offered for revoking its recognized student organization status. Second,
CLS has shown a likelihood that SIU impermissibly infringed on CLS's right of
expressive association. Finally, CLS has shown a likelihood that SIU violated
CLS's free speech rights by ejecting it from a speech forum in which it had a right
to remain.
Id.at 859-60.
129. See id.at 861-64 (evaluating the plaintiff's claim that SIU had impermissibly
infringed its right of expressive association).
130. Id.at 861 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
131. See id.
("When the government forces a group to accept for membership someone the
group does not welcome and the presence of the unwelcome person 'affects in a significant way
the group's ability to advocate' its viewpoint, the government has infringed on the group's
freedom of expressive association." (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648
(2000))).
132. See id.at 862 (describing the three-part framework from Dale). The court stated:
The likelihood of success on [the expressive association] claim turns on three
questions: (1) Is CLS an expressive association? (2) Would the forced inclusion of
active homosexuals significantly affect CLS's ability to express its disapproval of
homosexual activity? and (3) Does CLS's interest in expressive association
outweigh the university's interest in eradicating discrimination against
homosexuals?
Id.
133. Id.
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CLS would have to change its expressive message. 134 The court reasoned that
"CLS's beliefs about sexual morality are among its defining values; forcing it to
accept as members those who engage in or approve of homosexual conduct
would cause the group as it currently identifies itself to cease to exist."'135 On
the final question from the Dale framework, the court weighed CLS's right to
expressive association against SIU's interest in preventing discrimination
against homosexuals.36 SIU was unable to identify any legitimate motivation
for applying its nondiscrimination policy to CLS. 137 The court balanced this
against CLS's interest in exercising its First Amendment
freedoms, an interest
13
which was found to be "unquestionably substantial."' 1
SIU's principal argument against this rationale was that the situation was
not one of "forced inclusion," since the university was not forcing CLS to do
anything or accept anyone. 139 But the majority rejected this argument, based on
its finding that "[t]his case is legally indistinguishable from Healy."'140 The fact
134. See id. at 863 ("SIU's enforcement of its antidiscrimination policy upon penalty of
derecognition can only be understood as intended to induce CLS to alter its membership
standards-not merely allow attendance by nonmembers-in order to maintain recognition.").
The court went on to state:
CLS is a faith-based organization. One of its beliefs is that sexual conduct outside
of a traditional marriage is immoral. It would be difficult for CLS to sincerely and
effectively convey a message of disapproval of certain types of conduct if, at the
same time, it must accept members who engage in that conduct.
Id.
135. Id.
136. See id. ("In order to justify interfering with CLS's freedom of expressive association,
SIU's policy must serve a compelling state interest that is not related to the suppression of ideas
and that cannot be achieved through a less restrictive means.").
137. See id. ("[T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that antidiscrimination regulations
may not be applied to expressive conduct with the purpose of either suppressing or promoting a
particular viewpoint."). The court went on to state:
What interest does SIU have in forcing CLS to accept members whose
activities violate its creed other than eradicating or neutralizing particular
beliefs contained in that creed? SIU has identified none. The only
apparent point of applying the policy to an organization like CLS is to
induce CLS to modify the content of its expression or suffer the penalty of
derecognition.
Id.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 864.
140. Id. The court elaborated with the following statement:
CLS was deprived of the same benefits as the student group in Healy. Both were
frozen out of channels of communication offered by their universities; both were
denied university money and access to private university facilities for meetings.
SDS in Healy, like CLS here, could turn to alternative modes of communication
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was that "SIU may not do indirectly what it is constitutionally prohibited from
doing directly."' 4 ' Healy did allow universities to enforce reasonable campus
rules were directed at an organization's conduct
rules, 142 but only when those
43
and not its philosophy. 1

It
The court also addressed the free speech claim advanced by CLS' 44 145
forum,
of
type
a
was
status
organization
student
recognized
the
that
agreed
but declined to be more specific. 146 Because SIU was applying its policy in a
viewpoint-discriminatory way, 47 it did not matter what type of forum the
148
school had created-viewpoint discrimination is always impermissible.
Because CLS had demonstrated a likelihood of success on both its expressive
the
association claim and its free speech claim, the Seventh Circuit granted
149
preliminary injunction pending a full hearing by the district court.

and alternative meeting places, but the Supreme Court held that the student group's
"possible ability to exist outside the campus community does not ameliorate
significantly the disabilities imposed by" nonrecognition.
Id.(quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. (noting that there is a distinction between "rules directed at a student
organization's actions and rules directed at its advocacy or philosophy; the former might
provide a justification for nonrecognition, but the latter do not[]").
144. See id.at 865-67 (concluding that CLS demonstrated a likelihood of success on its
claim that SIU ejected it from a speech forum that it was otherwise entitled to occupy).
145. See id.at 866 ("Though recognized student organization status is a forum of the
theoretical rather than the physical kind-a street comer or public square is the physical kindthe same rules apply.").
146. See id.
("Whether S1U's student organization forum is a public, designated public, or
nonpublic forum is an inquiry that will require further factual development, and that is a task
properly left for the district court.").
147. See id.
("CLS is the only student group that has been stripped of its recognized status
on the basis that it discriminates on a ground prohibited by SIU's Affirmative Action/EEO
policy. CLS presented evidence that other recognized student organizations discriminate in
their membership requirements on grounds prohibited by SIU's policy.").
148. See id.
at 865 (noting that even in a nonpublic forum, speech restrictions "must not
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint"). The majority did note that "[t]here can be little doubt
that SIU's [policy] is viewpoint neutral on its face." Id.at 866.
149. Id.at 867. The parties eventually reached a settlement allowing CLS to continue as a
recognized student organization at SIU School of Law. See Memorandum of Understanding at
3 (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.telladf.orglUserDocs/CLS-SlUsettlement.pdf
(restoring registered student organization status to CLS at SIIJ while allowing CLS to maintain
its membership requirements).
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B. Truth v. Kent School District

The facts of Truth are similar to those of Walker, the only difference being
that the setting was a high school and not a university. The case arose out of
the attempts of a group of high school students at Kentridge High School to
obtain official school recognition for their Bible club (Truth). 150 In order to
obtain recognition, the group's charter had to be approved by the Associated
Student Body (ASB) Council.' 5' Official recognition bestowed such benefits as
the ability to meet on-campus during school hours, access to ASB funding,
access to a faculty advisor, and use of the public address system. 152 Non-ASB
recognized clubs could still use school facilities for meetings, but only during
noninstructional hours. 153 Student leaders of Truth submitted several iterations
of the club's charter to the ASB over the years, without any success. 154 After
the third rejection, the students filed suit against the school in federal district
court, alleging that the school had violated their First Amendment rights of free
speech and expressive association.' 55 At issue was the conflict between the
school district's nondiscrimination policy and Truth's charter. 156 The school
also relied on state nondiscrimination law to justify the denial. 1 57 The district
150. Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 2008).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 640.
153. Id.
154. Id. at637-40.
155. Id. at 638. The complaint also alleged that the school had violated the Equal Access
Act, the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
The court dealt with some of these claims, but they are not the focus of this Note.
156. See id. at 639 (describing Truth's charter and the reasons for ASB's refusal officially
to recognize the club). Specifically, while club meetings were open to all, the club's charter
listed several of the following criteria for voting members:
In order to be a voting member or officer, students are required to sign a "statement
of faith." The statement of faith requires the person to affirm that he or she believes
"the Bible to be the inspired, the only infallible, authoritative Word of God." A
voting member must also pledge that he or she believes "that salvation is an
undeserved gift from God," and that only by "acceptance of Jesus Christ as my
personal Savior, through His death on the cross for my sins, is my faith made real."
Id. (quoting Truth Club Charter, Membership Criteria). The primary impediment to official
recognition was Policy 3210, which states that "[t]he district will provide equal educational
opportunity and treatment for all students in all aspects of the academic and activities program.
Equal opportunity and treatment is provided without regard to race, creed, [or] color." Kent
School District Policy 3210. The district court held that inclusion of "creed" indicates that
discrimination based on religion is prohibited. Id.
157. See id. at 640 (noting that Kent School District relied on Washington Revised Code
§ 49.60.215).
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court entered summary judgment against Truth and held that the school district
had an adequate basis for denying official recognition to Truth. 58 The case
59
went to the Ninth Circuit, which conducted a de novo review.'
In the initial brief, counsel for Truth focused heavily on the claim that the
school district had violated the students' right of expressive association. 160 But
the court's unanimous opinion did not address this issue. Instead, the panel
focused on the type of forum that the school district had created and the
permissible speech restrictions within that forum.' 6' Adopting the Rosenberger
standard, 62 the court determined first that "[a]ccess to ASB recognition
qualifies as a limited public forum."'163 Based on this determination, the next
step was to determine whether the school district's nondiscrimination policies
were "viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purposes of the
forum."'164 One important part of a school's mission is to instill the value of

nondiscrimination. 16 Accordingly, the panel concluded that the decision to
deny access to official ASB recognition based on Truth's unwillingness to
adhere to the school's nondiscrimination policy was "reasonable in light of the
purposes of the forum.0 66 Furthermore, the school was not denying Truth
access to the ASB program on the basis of any viewpoint, but because Truth
refused to comply with school policy. 167 According to the court, "the District

no more engaged in viewpoint discrimination by excluding Truth for refusing
158. See id. at 641 ("The district court ruled on the merits of... some of the First
Amendment claims ....It held that the restrictions on general membership in the [club] charter
constituted a legitimate basis for denying the third charter ....
").
159. See id.("As to each issue, we review de novo.... In determining whether summary
judgment was appropriate, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Truth, the nonmoving party.").
160. See BriefofAppellant-Plaintiff at 17-25, Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., No. 04-35876 (9th
Cir. Feb. 18, 2005) (detailing Truth's contention that Kent School District had violated its right
of expressive association).
161. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634,648 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[W]e must evaluate
the District's denial of ASB recognition as a restriction on a 'limited public forum."' (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995))).
162. See id.
at 649 (reviewing Rosenberger's facts and analysis).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id.("The Supreme Court has emphasized that part of a school's mission is to
instill in students the 'shared values of a civilized social order,' which includes instilling the
value of non-discrimination." (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,272
(1988))).
166. Id.
167. See id.at 650 ("[T]he 'perspective of the speaker' was not the 'rationale' for denying
Truth access to the limited public forum." (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995))).
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to comply with its nondiscrimination policy than it would have engaged in
viewpoint discrimination by refusing to... [recognize] a Student Pro-Drug
Club that refused to obey the school's anti-drug policy.' ' 168 In other words,
there was nothing inherently viewpoint discriminatory about the school's
antidiscrimination policy as applied to student groups. Therefore, the court
69
held that the school district did not violate Truth's First Amendment rights.1
The case was remanded on other grounds. 170 A petition for rehearing en banc
was denied in December 2008.171
In a separate concurrence, joined by a second of the three panelists, Judge
Raymond Fisher focused on the expressive association claim raised by Truth. 72
But like the majority opinion, Judge Fisher framed the issue in terms of the type
of forum that the school had created. 173 He characterized expressive association
as "simply another way of speaking, only the group communicates its message
through the act of associating."'74 Therefore, in a limited public forum, any
restriction on the right of expressive association is legitimate so long as it17is5
viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purposes of the forum.
Judge Fisher noted that any approach that analyzed expressive association
claims apart from this framework would "accord an act of 'pure speech' such as

168. Id.
169. See id. at 651 ("We hold only that the District did not violate... Truth's First
Amendment rights by applying its non-discrimination policy to require Truth to remove its
general membership provision.").
170. See id. at 650 (discussing the possibility that the school district applied its
nondiscrimination policy in a viewpoint discriminatory way).
171. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 551 F.3d 850, 850 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying petition for
rehearing en banc).
172. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 651 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fisher, J.,
concurring) ("We write separately to amplify on one issue discussed in our main opinion. Truth
argued that it must be granted access to the ASB forum because conditioning its access...
would infringe its right to engage in speech through 'expressive association."'); id. (Fisher, J.,
concurring) ("Expressive association may be burdened when the state requires a group to change
its membership criteria ...or when the state conditions access to a traditional public forum
upon such changes.... ").
173. See id (Fisher, J., concurring) ("As our opinion explains, when the state creates a
limitedpublic forum, like the ASB program at issue here, it may restrict access to that forum...
even if these rules have the effect of limiting a group's ability to engage in protected
speech....").
174. Id.at 652 (Fisher, J., concurring).
175. See id. (Fisher, J., concurring) ("When the state restricts access to a limited public
forum in a way that interferes with a group's speech or expressive association.., we apply the
lesser standard of scrutiny, even if the same burden on the group's rights outside a limited
public forum would be subject to strict scrutiny.").
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publishing a newspaper-the core of what the First
Amendment protects-less
17 6
protection than an act of expressive association."
Interestingly, Judge Fisher briefly discussed the Walker case in a
footnote.'
He attempted to distinguish Walker by pointing out that the
Seventh Circuit never determined what type of forum the university had
created. 78 The judge noted that "Walker did not say that strict scrutiny would
be appropriate in all cases, even if the university had created something less
than an open forum." 179 But this statement completely mischaracterizes the
approach taken by the Seventh Circuit, ignoring the fact that the Seventh
Circuit treated the free speech claim and the expressive association claim
separately.180 The Walker court did not consider it necessary to characterize
the type of forum at issue when analyzing the expressive association claim
made by CLS.1 81 The Truth opinion clearly departs from the Walker opinion on
this point. 8 2 Because the concurrence represented a majority of the panel, it
carries precedential weight that would not otherwise be afforded to a standard
183
concurrence.

176. Id. (Fisher, J., concurring).
177. See id. at 652 n. 1 (Fisher, J., concurring) (mentioning the Seventh Circuit Walker
case).
178. See id. (Fisher, J., concurring) ("Although the Seventh Circuit applied strict scrutiny
in addressing this claim, it notably stated that it could not even determine, on the limited record
before it, whether the university had created an open, limited, or nonpublic forum.").
179. Id. (Fisher, J., concurring).
180. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 551 F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2008) (Bea, J.,
dissenting from the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc) ("The [Walker] court analyzed the
two claims separately, applying strict scrutiny to the expressive association claim and the limited
public forum analysis to the free speech claim.").
181. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 861-64 (7th Cir. 2006) (analyzing
expressive association claim in light of Dale and Healy).
182. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 551 F.3d 850, 855 (9th Cir. 2008) (Bea, J., dissenting
from the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc) ("Furthermore, the majority concurrence's
opinion causes an inter-circuit split with the Seventh Circuit's decision in [ Walker]."); see also
1 SMOLLA, supra note 25, § 13:14 (noting that the court in Truth reached a "different
conclusion" from the court in Walker).
183. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist, 551 F.3d 850,851 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (Bea, J., dissenting
from the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc) ("This [Truth concurrence] is no standard
concurrence... because two of the three members of the panel concur in it. Thus, it is the
opinion of the panel on this issue and creates binding precedent.").
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V Analysis
It is important to be clear about what is at stake. DHCC' 84 has created an
avenue for student groups to obtain official recognition-with all the attendant
benefits. However, in accordance with university policy, official recognition is
available only to groups which do not discriminate in their membership/officer
requirements on the basis of certain characteristics such as religious belief or
sexual orientation. If DHCC's nondiscrimination policy is viewed as a speech
limitation on the limited public forum the school has created, then, according to
the Truth court, that limitation must be viewpoint neutral and reasonable in
light of the purposes of the forum. 185 If, on the other hand, this policy is
viewed as inherently conflicting with a student group's expressive association
rights-by forcing the group to accept members it would rather not acceptthen, according to the Walker court, the policy must be justified by a
compelling
state interest that outweighs the associational interests of the student
86
group.'
As an aside, accepting the Walker approach does not necessarily mean that
DHCC could not demonstrate a compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination based on religion or sexual orientation. 187 This would be
difficult, however, given the fact that the Supreme Court has only recognized a
handful of characteristics-including race and gender-as classes meriting
special protection. 88 The Court has never recognized sexual orientation as a
suspect class, 8 9 and has indicated that certain forms ofreligious discrimination

184. See supra Part I (describing a hypothetical situation involving a discriminatory
college club).
185. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) ("When the
State establishes a limited public forum, the State is not required to and does not allow persons
to engage in every type of speech .... The State's power to restrict speech, however, is not
without limits. The restriction must not discriminate against speech on the basis of
viewpoint .... ).
186. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) ("The right to associate for
expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified by
regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas,
that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.").
187. See Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536
A.2d 1, 38 (D.C. 1987) (finding that eliminating discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is a compelling state interest).
188. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (finding race is a suspect
class); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to genderbased classification).
189. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (applying rational basis scrutiny to a
state law permitting sexual-orientation based discrimination).
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are necessary for the vitality of a religious organization. 19 Furthermore, given
the diversity of student groups that exists at most public universities and high
schools, it is doubtful that a student would be severely disadvantaged by being
excluded from membership in one particular group.191 Regardless, the level of
scrutiny a court will apply to the nondiscrimination policy depends on which
framework the court applies-speech or expressive association: "Government
action that infringes on the right of expressive association is subject to strict
scrutiny .... By contrast, government action that infringes on the right of free
speech in a limited public forum such as a school, is subject to a lower level of
scrutiny."'192 Commenting on the Truth decision, one First Amendment scholar
noted the following:
It is simply not enough to say that the First Amendment rights of a student
group are not violated when it is forced to accept members it does not wish
to accept, because the student group is violating a general school policy,
akin to an anti-drug use policy. For the whole point of the freedom of
association line of First Amendment cases is that freedom of association
includes a correlative First Amendment freedom of nonassociation, and
freedom of nonassociation is in inherent tension with anti-discrimination
policies, which force association. Thus, anti-discrimination policies are not
like anti-drug use policies in that anti-discrimination policies by their
193
intrinsic nature render certain forms of freedom of nonassociation null.
The Walker court treated the expressive association claim as completely
separate from the speech claim, while the Truth court ignored the expressive
association interests and focused solely on speech in the limited public forum.
But is there a third way? Can a group's First Amendment interest in speech
andassociation survive even in the "limited public forum" of the public school
or university? The following Part provides a possible way to resolve this issue.

190. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342-43 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("We are willing to
countenance the imposition of... [discrimination in employment based on religion] because we
deem it vital that, if certain activities constitute part of a religious community's practice, then a
religious organization should be able to require that only members of its community perform
those activities.").
191. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1919,
1964-65 (2006) (arguing that "[t]here is nothing here like the massive and often economically
crippling race discrimination in employment and education that triggered the Civil Rights Act
and triggered the rejection of demands for religious exemptions from that Act").
192. Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 551 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 2008) (Bea, J., dissenting from
the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc).
193. 2 SMOLLA, supra note 25, § 17:42.
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A. The Message and the Messenger
1. PersonnelIs Policy: In Theory

It is clear that the right of expressive association is necessary to protect a
collective message-especially if that message is an unpopular one. 194 When a
group of people come together around a common set of beliefs for the purpose
of expressing a message, the First Amendment interests of the group go beyond
the protection of the message itself.1 95 The Court's line of expressiveassociation cases-from Roberts to Dale-makes it clear that just as a group's
message deserves strong First Amendment protections, so does that group's
ability to shape the message. 196 It is a "fundamental rule ofprotection under the
First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his
own message."1 97 In the context of group advocacy, choosing the content of the
message inevitably involves choosing the members who express that message:
"[A]n association engaged exclusively in protected expression enjoys First
Amendment protection of both the content of its message and the choice of its
members. Protection of the message itself is judged by the same standards as
protection of speech by an individual."' 98 How else can a group ensure that its
message is conveyed than by selecting the members to convey it? How can a
club that wants to provide an opportunity for students "interested in growing in

194. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000) ("This right is
crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would express other,
perhaps unpopular, ideas."); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1983) ("According
protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the
majority."); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958) ("Effective advocacy of
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced
by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close
nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.").
195. See Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74
YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1964) ("[A]s a general principle, the right of individuals to associate or to refrain
from association ought to be protected to the same extent, and for the same reasons, as
individual liberty is protected. Thus, as a starting point, an association should be entitled to do
whatever an individual can do.. ").
196. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,648 (2000) ("Government actions that
may unconstitutionally burden this freedom may take many forms, one of which is 'intrusion
into the internal structure or affairs of an association' .. . ." (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984))).
197. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,

573 (1995).
198. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 633 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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their relationship with Jesus Christ"'199 effectively accomplish this if its own

members and officers cannot be required to profess any religious belief at all,
let alone a belief in Christian teachings? 2°° When a state actor wants to change
an expressive group's membership criteria by applying a nondiscrimination law
to that group, it must have a compelling reason for doing so precisely because
"[f]orcing a group to accept certain members may impair the ability of the
group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to
express. 20 ' The means that a group uses to express its message-the
membership criteria-are a part of that message.20 2
This principle can be illustrated by thinking of the group's message as a
chair, and the membership policy-the freedom of nonassociation-as one of
the legs of the chair. The leg provides vital support for the chair, to the extent
that the chair could not function without it. Cut out the leg and, for all intents
and purposes, the chair is useless. In the same way, a group's message is
supported by its membership policies. When the two are that interconnected,
eliminating one effectively cripples the other. The case ofHsu v. Roslyn Union
Free School Distric?0 3 illustrates this principle.
2. PersonnelIs Policy: In Practice
The basic facts of Hsu are very similar to those in Truth: A religious
student group was denied recognition by the high school board because the
students refused to alter the club's charter to allow nonbelievers to hold
leadership positions. 204 This provision violated the district's nondiscrimination
2
policy. 205 The students sued the school district under the Equal Access Act06
based on the following provision:
199. Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 2008).
200. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 551 F.3d 850, 854 (9th Cir. 2008) (Bea, J., dissenting
from the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc) ("[T]he school district here 'at the very least'
forces the Christian Bible study group to send a message that its agenda, discussions, and
meetings can be framed, and their content determined, by non-Christians.").
201. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
202. See Marshall, supra note 25, at 79-80 (arguing that a group's right to discriminate is
strongest when "the organizations discriminatory criteria relate directly to its advocacy").
203. See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 848 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that religious club should have been granted access to school forum under the terms of
the Equal Access Act).
204. Id.at 851.
205. See id.
at 850 (providing that every student should have equal access to extracurricular
activities without regards to religious beliefs).
206. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1997).
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It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal
financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal
access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who
wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum
20 7 on the basis of
the religious.., content of the speech at such meetings.

One of the key issues considered by the three-judge panel was whether the
discriminatory leadership requirements of the club constituted the "content" of
the club's speech.20 8 The school argued that its decision to deny official
recognition to the student club was not based on the club's speech, but on the
"act" of excluding nonbelievers from leadership positions. 20 9 But the majority
rejected this notion, noting that in this case there was "an integral connection
between the exclusionary leadership policy and the 'religious speech' at [the
club's] meetings. 2 10 The majority drew on the principles from the Supreme
Court's decision in Hurley,211 because as in that case involving parade
organizers, the student group's decision to limit its leadership positions to
religious believers was based on its desire "to preserve the content of its
message., 21 2 The fact was that the exclusive membership policy was for
"purely expressive purposes.. . rather than for the sake of the exclusion
itself. 2 1 3 This principle applies to all clubs with an expressive message:
[O]ne of the principal ways in which many extracurricular clubs typically
define themselves [is] by requiring that their leaders show a firm
commitment to the club's cause. [For example] ... it would be sensibleand unremarkable in light of the club's particular purposes-for the
Students Protecting the Environment Against Contamination Club to

require that officers have a demonstrated commitment to conservation or
207. Id.§ 4071(a).
208. See Hsu, 85 F.3d at 856 ("Did the School refise to recognize the Hsus' club 'on the
basis of the religious... content of the speech at [the Club's] meetings'?" (quoting Equal
Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (a) (1997))). While the ruling in Hsu was based on the provisions
of the Equal Access Act, the Second Circuit noted that "since the Act creates an analog to the
First Amendment's default rule banning content-based speech discrimination, cases discussing
the meaning of 'speech' in First Amendment jurisprudence are also interpretive tools for
understanding the Act." Id.at 856-57.
209. See id. ("One might argue that there is no 'speech' at issue here.... The School has
demonstrated that it would recognize [the club] .. . without regard to the content of the club's
prayers or discussions, so long as no religious exclusions were made.").
210. Id. at 857.
211. See id.at 856 ("The lesson we draw from Hurley is that the principle of 'speaker's
autonomy' gives a speaker the right, in some circumstances, to prevent certain groups from
contributing to the speaker's speech, if the groups' contribution would alter the speaker's
message.").
212. Id.
213. Id.at 859.
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recycling; [or] for Students Against Drunk Driving to require that officers
have taken the pledge; or for Students for Social Responsibility to require
that officers have a social conscience.... All of these "tests" of an
officer's commitment to the group's cause allow the group to ensure that its
agenda will be advanced at its meetings.214
When the message and the membership criteria are so closely intertwined, if
one is destroyed, the other risks destruction. The Second Circuit concluded that
nondiscrimination policies do regulate the content of a group's speech when
they conflict with the group's membership criteria. 21 Regulating a group's
membership decisions is effectively the same as regulating a group's message:
"[B]y permitting the school to regulate the membership which controls the
group's expression, it ineluctably controls the group's viewpoint-'personnel is
, 216
policy.'

3. Putting the Pieces Together
This principle, that the membership criteria is part ofthe group's message,
provides the framework for how an expressive association claim can merge
with the public forum doctrine as it applies to public schools and universities.
When a school creates a limited public forum open to student groups, any
regulation that limits access to that forum based on the message of the group is
subject to strict scrutiny.2 17 If the message and the membership criteria are so
closely related, then arguably, as in Hsu, the group's membership criteria
deserve the same protection as the message itself. In other words, a regulation
that targets the membership criteria of a group-for example, a
nondiscrimination policy-should be subject to the same scrutiny that to which
a regulation targeting the message would be subject.
This connection between message and membership is exactly what the
second part of the Dale framework addresses: Does the presence of an
unwanted individual "significantly burden 2 1 8 a group's ability to express its
214. Id. at 860.
215. See id. at 859 ("We can conclude ... that when an after-school religious club excludes
people of other religions from conducting its meetings, and when that choice is made to protect
the expressive content of the meetings, a school's decision to deny recognition to the club
because of the exclusion is a decision based on the [content of the speech] .... ).
216. Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 551 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2008) (Bea, J., dissenting firom
the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc).
217. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (applying strict scrutiny to a
content-based speech restriction on a limited public forum at a public university).
218. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,653 (2000).
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message? This is the exact framework that the Walker court applied to the
Christian Legal Society's claim.21 9 Members of CLS had to affirm the moral
principles contained in the statement of faith-including the principle that
sexual conduct outside of traditional marriage is morally wrong.22 ° It would be
very difficult for CLS to effectively convey this message if it also must accept
members who are practicing homosexuals, and this is exactly what the Walker
court found.22' Of course, not every student group could justify discriminatory
membership policies.2 22 It would not make sense for the Chess Club to exclude
women, or for the Forensics Group to be open only to Catholics. But if the
presence of an unwanted member would significantly burden the group's
ability to express its message, and if the membership policies reflect this, then a
regulation that targets those membership policies also targets the message.
Therefore, when a university creates a limited public forum for student
groups, on the condition that the groups must have nondiscriminatory
membership policies, a court would have to determine whether forcing a group
to make this change would significantly affect the group's ability to convey its
message-the Dale standard.223 If the answer is yes, then, just like in Hsu, the
court could-and should-conclude that the group's membership policies are a
part of the group's message, and therefore any regulation that targets the
policies targets the message. And in the university's limited public forum, a
restriction that targets a group's message must survive strict scrutiny 224 -the
same standard the Court consistently has applied to laws violating a group's
right of expressive association.22 5 The bottom line is that if the membership
219. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying the
three-part test from Dale to determine if petitioner's right of expressive association was
violated).
220. See id. (listing the principles contained in CLS's statement of beliefs).
221. See id. at 863 ("It would be difficult for CLS to sincerely and effectively convey a
message of disapproval of certain types of conduct if,at the same time, it must accept members
who engage in that conduct.").
222. See Marshall, supra note 25, at 77 ("Not every association promotes ideas, however.
Tom and Fred walking down the street is, in no meaningful sense, expression. Similarly, there
is little or no expression inherent in the membership criteria of a Friday night bridge club or an
all-white country club.").
223. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (requiring an expressive
group to show that the presence of an unwanted member would significantly burden that
group's ability to express its message).
224. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (applying strict scrutiny to a
content-based speech restriction on a limited public forum at a public university).
225. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("Infringements on...
[the right of expressive association] may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.").
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policies and the message are so closely intertwined, then the expressive
association analysis from Dale applies the same standard that the limited public
forum analysis from Widmar applies: Strict scrutiny.
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Truth would give universities
an end run around constitutional proscriptions against content-and viewpointbased discrimination in a limited public forum. The school cannot exclude a
student group because of the religious content of its message, yet the school can
exclude the club for failure to comply with a nondiscrimination policy that
effectively guts the club's ability to convey its message. A university could not
exclude a student group like CLS based on that group's expressed disapproval
of the homosexual lifestyle, but forcing that group to adopt a "reasonable"
nondiscrimination policy effectively accomplishes the same result.226 And
under the Truth approach, as long as the nondiscrimination policy is reasonable
and applied evenhandedly, the affected student group has no recourse.227 The
powerful First Amendment interests of student associations deserve more
protection than a mere "reasonableness" standard would provide.
B. Problem with the Limited PublicForum Standard
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Truth took its cues from the Supreme
Court's limited public forum discussion in the Rosenberger case. 228 The
problem with this is that it completely ignored the way the Supreme Court
applied the public forum doctrine to the university context in Widmar v.
Vincent.229 Widmar stands for the proposition that when a university creates a

226. See Wojciech Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint NeutralityandFreedom
of Speech, 15 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 315, 359 (1997) ("A regulation may be viewpoint
discriminatory... even if it picks up content-neutral characteristics of speech, such as the status
of speakers or the manner of communication. If a regulation is viewpoint discriminatory in its
effect, then all the reasons that justify hostility to open viewpoint discrimination apply."). It
should be noted that many schools' nondiscrimination policies are motivated by a hostility to
contrary viewpoints on homosexuality. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006) ("According to FAIR, law schools' ability to express their
message that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is wrong is significantly affected
by the presence of military recruiters on campus and the schools' obligation to assist them.").
227. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634,649-50 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that
the high school district's nondiscrimination policy was reasonable in light ofthe purposes of the
forum and viewpoint neutral).
228. See id. at 649 (citing Rosenberger for the proposition that speech restrictions in a
limited public forum need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral).
229. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. See supra Part lII.B for a discussion of two Supreme Court
cases with different conceptions of the limited public forum in the university context.
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forum that is "generally open to student groups, ' ,230 any content-based speech
restrictions must be supported by a compelling state interest. 23' The public
forum in the Widmar case, school recognition, gave student groups access to
school facilities for meetings.232 In Rosenbergerthe forum in question was a
student activities fund, 233 available for activities that were in line with the
educational goals of the University.234 The Rosenberger Court characterized
the fund as a limited public forum where there was a distinction between, "on
the one hand, content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves
the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint
discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum's limitations." 235 In both Widmar and Rosenberger,
the Court characterized the university program as a limited public forum, but
the levels of scrutiny it applied to the restrictions on the respective fora were
very different. 236 Attempts by lower courts to resolve the confusion have met
with little success.237
230. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277.
231. See id.
at 269-70 ("In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum
based on the .. content of a group's intended speech, the University... must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end.") (emphasis added).
232. See Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,46 n.7 (1983) ("A
[designated] public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups,
e.g., [Widmar] ....
").
233. Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 824 (1995).
234. Id.
235. Id.at 830.
236. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (applying
the same analysis to a limited public forum that the Court would apply to a nonpublic forum);
Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (same). But see Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 796 (1984) ("The [lower court] did not
decide whether the [forum] was a limited public forum or a nonpublic forum....."). Writing for
the Seventh Circuit in the Walker case, Judge Sykes noted that this confusion over the term
"limited public forum" had "infected the litigation." Christian Legal Soc'yv. Walker, 453 F.3d
853, 865 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Matthew D. McGill, Note, Unleashingthe LimitedPublic
Forum: A Modest Revision of a Dysfunctional Doctrine, 52 STAN. L. REv. 929, 931 (2000)
(arguing that the current version of the limited public forum doctrine is "totally unworkable").
237. See Child Evangelism Fellowship v. Montgomery Sch., 457 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir.
2006) ("Although the Court has never squarely addressed the difference between a designated
public forum and a limited public forum, its most recent opinions suggest that there indeed is a
distinction."). The court went on to state:
In a limited public forum, the government creates a channel for a specific or limited
type of expression where one did not previously exist. In such a forum, "the State
may be justified in reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of
certain topics," subject only to the limitation that its actions must be viewpoint
neutral and reasonable.
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One way to distinguish the two is that Widmar involved access to school
facilities, while Rosenbergerinvolved access to funding. This distinction was
238 When the university itself is the
rejected by the Court in Rosenberger.
speaker, it has significant discretion to shape its message. 239 A different
situation occurs when the university creates a forum for private speakers.24
The reality is that official recognition at many schools and universities
includes access to both facilities and funding-Walker being one example.2 4'
The benefits also often include permission to post advertisements on school
bulletin boards and access to a faculty advisor.242 When all of these benefits
come with official recognition, what type of forum has the school created?
When the consequences of nonrecognition include loss of classroom space for
meetings, loss of bulletin board access, loss of the ability to reserve conference
rooms free of charge, andloss of funding, the limited public forum created by
the school resembles the forum in Widmar much more than the one in
Rosenberger,243 and therefore the stronger speech protections apply: In a forum

Id. (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001)); see also
Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 916 n.14 (10th Cir. 1997) ("We recognize that the
boundary between a designated public forum for a limited purpose (e.g., Widmar) and a limited
public forum (e.g., Rosenberger... ) is far from clear.... We simply note that a designated
public forum for a limited purpose and a limited public forum are not interchangeable terms.").
238. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832 (rejecting the university's attempt to distinguish
access to facilities from access to funding).
239. See id. at 833 ("When the University determines the content of the education it
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the
content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to
convey its own message.").
240. See id. at 834 ("It does not follow, however.... that viewpoint-based restrictions are
proper when the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors
but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.").
241. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006) (listing
benefits of official recognition, including ability to reserve classrooms for meetings, free access
to school auditorium, and access to university funds).
242. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2008) (listing benefits of
official recognition, including advertising in school, use of the public address system, and a
faculty advisor).
243. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION MANUAL 4, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL
HILL, availableathttp://carolinaunion.unc.edu/index.php?&gid=77&Itemid=40 (listing benefits
of Official University Recognition, including access to school facilities, access to bulletin
boards, and funding opportunities); STUDENT ORGANIZATION SOURCE BOOK 15, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS, availableat http://spac.ucdavis.edu/sos/SOSGuide.cfin (same). Butsee
REGISTRATION GUIDELINES FOR STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS AT OHIO STATE 6, Omo STATE

UNIVERSITY, available at http://ohiounion.osu.edu/posts/documents/OSUStudentOrgRegis

trationGuidelines 07-08.pdf (granting benefits to unregistered student organizations, including
access to university facilities and bulletin boards).
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for student groups, content-based speech restrictions are subject to strict
scrutiny.
C. ForcedInclusion or ConditionedBenefits?
Of course, an underlying premise of this discussion is that when a school
or university creates a limited public forum for student groups that do not
discriminate, any student group that wishes to retain its membership policies is
being "forced" to do otherwise. Some would argue that, in both Truth and
Walker, schools were not forcing the student clubs to accept anyone. 244
Nonrecognition is not the same as forced inclusion. 245 A group such as Truth
theoretically could exist outside the ASB forum, maintaining control over its
246
own membership policies while promoting whatever message it pleases.
This argument is constitutionally suspect, though, because student groups
have rights of speech and association on school grounds.247 As the Court stated
in Healy, "the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because
of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply
with less force on college campuses than in the community at large., 248 Of
course, some Court cases have advanced the notion that free speech protections
at high schools are more malleable, 249 but this notion has never been extended
to nondiscrimination policies. 250 At both universities and high schools, a
244. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634,648 (9th Cir. 2008) ("As an initial matter,
it is important to emphasize that the members of Truth are not seeking merely to associate as a
group; they are seeking to associate as a school-sponsored group."); see also Christian Legal
Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 873 (7th Cir. 2006) (Wood, J., dissenting) ("[The University]
has in no way tried to compel CLS to admit members or to elect officers that offend its precepts.
It has said only that CLS must content itself with the benefits and support given to nonrecognized student organizations .... ").
245. See Case Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-FirstAmendment-Seventh CircuitHolds
that Public University CannotRefuse to Recognize Student Group Based on Group's Violation
of SchoolNondiscriminationPolicy-Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir.
2006), 120 HARv. L. REv. 1112, 1116 (2007) (criticizing the Seventh Circuit for incorrectly
characterizing "SIU's derecognition of CLS as forced inclusion when the evidence does not
support such an interpretation").
246. See Truth, 542 F.3d at 639-40 (noting that the Kent School District allowed
nonrecognized student groups to meet on school grounds before or after normal school hours).
247. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.").
248. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
249. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.Ct. 2618,2629(2007) (holding that a high school
may censor student speech that occurs on school grounds that school administrators "reasonably
regard as promoting illegal drug use").
250. See 2 SMOL.A, supra note 25, § 17:42 ("The Supreme Court, however, has not
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diversity of student groups adds to the "quality and creative power of student
intellectual life,"05 1 which is "a vital measure of a school's influence and
attainment. ,212
Furthermore, the argument completely ignores the potentially crippling
effects that nonrecognition can-and often does-have on student groups. For
example, accepting the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Truth, a student group's
ability to form and meet on campus would be effectively at the mercy of the
administration and the nondiscrimination policies it implements. What would
stop the Kent School District administration from saying that school classroom
access at any time is only open to groups that comply with the school's
nondiscrimination policy? If school classrooms constitute a limited public
forum (in the Rosenbergersense), as long as the nondiscrimination policy was
reasonable and viewpoint neutral-a question that the Ninth Circuit has already
decided in Truth 253-nothing would prevent Kent High School (or any other
school) from taking this action. Student groups could go "underground" or
meet off campus, but how realistic is that when the school is effectively closing
off the one place that unites the student community?.25 4 Many student groups
are faced with a difficult choice as they must choose between having access to
the school community and accepting unwanted members-and consequently
altering their expressive message. 255 As the Court stated in Healy, "[w]e are
not free to disregard the practical realities. 2 56 To say that nonrecognition is a
small price to pay is little comfort to a group that cannot post on school bulletin
boards, cannot get a faculty advisor, cannot reserve classrooms for meetings or
speakers, and cannot access funding available to other student groups. A

extended this notion of diminished First Amendment protection for students to the free
association rights of high school student groups.").
251. Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995).

252. Id.
253. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634,649-50 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that
the nondiscrimination policy of the ASB was reasonable and viewpoint neutral).

254. See Richard M. Paul III & Derek Rose, Comment, The Clash Between the First
Amendment and Civil Rights: Public University NondiscriminationClauses, 60 Mo. L. REV.
889, 892 ("In essence, the University holds the tickets to the 'marketplace of ideas' on

university campuses. Without a ticket, access to the market is barred.").
255.
TRIBUNE,

See, e.g., Richard N. Ostling, Christian Group, Some Colleges at Odds, CHICAGO
Jan. 17, 2003, at 6 (describing conflict between InterVarsity Fellowship (IVF) and

Rutgers University after university officials threatened to ban IVF from campus if the group
failed to change its membership policies that discriminated on the basis of religion and sexual
orientation); John Leo, Playingthe Bias Card,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 13, 2003, at 41
(describing same conflict at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
256. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972).
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group's ability to exist outside the campus forum does not lessen the
debilitating impact that nonrecognition can have.257
VI. Conclusion
What does this mean for Charles and Maddie? Diablo Hills has created a
forum for student groups to obtain access to campus facilities and resources,
but that access comes at a price-no discrimination on the basis of religious
belief. Yet the whole point of the Huxley Club is to provide a counterweight to
religious belief systems. If the Huxley Club is an expressive association-and
it most certainly is-then Dale's test applies: Would the presence of religious
believers significantly affect the Club's ability to convey its message that
religious belief is irrational and dangerous? In the words of the Walker court,
"[t]o ask this question is very nearly to answer it."'2 58 The membership
requirements provide a foundation for the message-remove the former and the
latter has very little to stand on. 25 9 Like in Hsu, because the leadership
requirements are designed to ensure that a certain message is conveyed, those
requirements are a part of the message, and any restriction that targets those
requirements targets the message itself. And based on the Court's decision in
Widmar, even in the "limited public forum" created by DHCC, content-based
speech restrictions must survive strict scrutiny-the same outcome Dale
requires. By coming together to form a common voice, Charles and Maddie are
exercising a right that deserves the strongest of safeguards 26 0 -safeguards
which apply with equal force on and off the school campus. A university may
put a high value on tolerance, but when that value conflicts with vital
associational freedoms, it must be put to the test. The First Amendment
demands nothing less.

257. See id. at 183 ("Likewise, in this case, the group's possible ability to exist outside the
campus community does not ameliorate significantly the disabilities imposed by the
[university's] action.").
258. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2006).
259. See Mark Andrew Snider, Note, Viewpoint Discriminationby Public Universities:
Student Religious Organizationsand Violations of University NondiscriminationPolicies,61
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841,878 (2004) ("Without protection of each group's associational rights,
a Zionist group is not insulated from the demands of a Neo-Nazi to be made a leader, an atheist
group cannot ensure that fundamentalist Christians will not infiltrate it, and a small Hindu group
cannot protect itself from 'take over' by a larger group of Muslims.").
260. See Marshall, supra note 25, at 70 ("[Tlhere is no question that [the right of
association] is at the core of our nation's philosophical and social foundation.").

